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Abstract We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction
in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two
treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In
the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it.
Referring to the latter as “net positive” rewards, we observe that these are used more
frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective
in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game.
Keywords Peer enforcement . Rewards . Common pool resource . Economic
experiment
JEL Classification C72, C92, D74
1 Introduction
Previous research on self-regulatory mechanisms in social dilemma games shows
that peer sanctioning is effective in mitigating the freerider problem inherent to these
games. Experimental subjects are willing to incur costs to impose (monetary and non-
monetary) sanctions on those who fail to contribute to the common good, and the
punished subjects respond by acting more cooperatively. This behavior is observed in
a wide variety of social dilemma games, including Public Goods games (e.g., Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2000; Carpenter, 2006; Masclet et al., 2003) and Common Pool Resource
games (Ostrom et al.,1992; van Soest and Vyrastekova, 2006).
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Although rewards have not been researched as thoroughly as sanctions, earlier
results suggest that they are not as effective—if effective at all. In the context of
social dilemma situations, there are two studies that analyze the impact of rewards
on contributions in linear Public Goods games; one by Sefton et al. (2006) and one
by Walker and Halloran (2004). Both focus on so-called transfer rewards, where the
subject giving the reward incurs a cost of a certain number of experimental currency
units while the recipient’s payoff goes up by the same amount (that is, the impact ratio
is 1:1). The two studies differ with respect to whether interaction is one-shot or finitely
repeated, but both find that transfer rewards are unable to sustain cooperation.
Given that these studies focus on transfer rewards (that is, a 1:1 impact ratio), the
question arises how sensitive this conclusion is to the impact ratio used. One paper that
suggests that the parameterization matters is by Andreoni et al. (2003). They study
a simple proposer-responder game in which the responder can affect the proposer’s
payoff using either 1:5 sanctions, or 1:5 rewards, or both. Both sanctions and rewards
tokens are used frequently, and their presence positively affects the amounts offered
by the proposer. As a result, offers exceed the Nash equilibrium level in all three
treatments, and more so in the rewards treatment than in the sanctions treatment (albeit
that they are highest in the treatment where both instruments are at the responder’s
disposal).
The above research suggests that whereas transfer rewards fail to induce cooperation
in social dilemma situations, rewards may be effective if the benefits of receiving a
reward exceed the costs of providing them, as is the case in the 1:5 parameterization
of Andreoni et al. This is important because in many instances, a recipient’s valuation
of a reward is not likely to be exactly equal to the costs incurred by the donor. When
rewards take the form of monetary transactions, the costs of giving up a dollar by the
donor is not necessarily equal to the benefits derived by the recipient, for example if
the subjects involved differ with respect to income or wealth. And rewards may also
take the form of the exchange of goods or services, for which marginal utilities may
differ substantially between individuals. Food sharing in times of scarcity in hunter-
gatherer societies is an example in point. Also, assisting fellow community members
with activities such as crop harvesting or child minding implies that the recipient’s
time constraint becomes less binding, and the recipient’s marginal value of time may
well be above that of the donor. So, whereas rewards are effectively transfers in some
instances, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the recipient’s valuation of
a reward exceeds the costs incurred by the donor.
In this paper, we re-examine the effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation
in social dilemma games. We compare the (in)effectiveness of transfer rewards (i.e.,
with a 1:1 impact ratio) to that of what we label ‘net positive’ rewards, where the
benefits of receiving a reward are larger than the costs incurred by the provider. More
specifically, we use a 1:3 impact ratio, where a reward costs one point (our experimental
currency unit) but increases the recipient’s payoff by three points. Changing impact
ratio’s has been found to substantially affect the effectiveness of sanctions (Carpenter,
2006; Egas and Riedl, 2005), and we conjecture that the same holds for rewards.
Net positive rewards increase the recipient’s payoff more than do transfer rewards,
and we conjecture that this is important because of two reasons. First, the higher the
payoff foregone by a freerider when not receiving rewards, the more likely he/she is
to act (more) cooperatively in the social dilemma game in order to attract rewards.
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Second, the higher a reward’s benefit/cost ratio, the more likely it is to compensate
the provider (in terms of utility derived from increasing another subject’s payoff) for
his/her costs incurred; cf. Andreoni and Miller (2002). Hence, the higher this ratio,
the more frequently rewards are expected to be given. Combining these two aspects,
we hypothesize net positive rewards to have a stronger impact on behavior in social
dilemmas than transfer rewards.
Whereas the bulk of the experimental literature on self-regulation employs linear
Public Goods games, we study rewards in a non-linear public bad game (the Common
Pool Resource game; cf. Ostrom et al., 1992). Thus, we (i) provide a robustness check
with respect to whether transfer rewards are indeed also inefficient in games with
negative as opposed to positive externalities, and (ii) expose the net positive rewards
to a very harsh environment which is even less conducive to cooperation than Public
Goods games.
We find that rewards are given more frequently when their impact is higher. Whereas
transfer rewards do not significantly affect behavior in the CPR game, net positive
rewards do. This result is not very surprising in itself, but the underlying mechanisms
are interesting. Changing the impact ratio not only affects the number of rewards
exchanged, but also who rewards whom.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the game and the
experiment design, and we formulate our behavioral hypotheses. The data are analyzed
in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
2 The game and experimental design
2.1 The game
We use a standard finitely repeated Common Pool Resource (CPR) game in line with
earlier work by Ostrom et al. (1992). There are N players, N > 1. In every period
t = 1, . . . , T , each player i = 1, . . . , N can divide a fixed endowment of discrete
tokens (referred to also as extraction tokens), e > 0, between CPR extraction (option I)
and an alternative economic activity (option II). The number of tokens put into option
I by player i in period t is denoted by xi,t , and hence the number of tokens player i
puts into option II is equal to (e − xi,t ). For each token player i puts into option II,
he/she receives a fixed number of points (our experimental currency unit); this number
is equal to w. When putting tokens in option I, however, players incur costs that are
linear in the number of tokens with marginal cost equal to v. The group’s total number
of points earned in option I in period t , Rt , depend on the aggregate number of tokens
put in in that period, Xt =
∑N
i=1 xi,t , according to the function R(Xt ) = AXt − B X2t .
Player i’s share in these total revenues is proportional to his/her share in the aggregate
number of tokens put into option I (xi,t/Xt ). Hence, player i’s payoff in period t equals




AXt − B X2t
] − vxi,t .
The group’s aggregate payoff is maximized if the number of tokens in option
I is equal to X∗ = (A − v − w)/2B. So, in the absence of transfers, the social
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optimum is obtained if each player uses x∗ = (A − v − w)/2B N ‘extraction tokens’.1
The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium number of extraction tokens equals xNE =
(A − v − w)/B(N + 1) for each individual, and XNE = N xNE for the group as a
whole. Observe that the CPR game poses a social dilemma because xNE > x∗ if N > 1.
The game described above will be referred to as the unregulated CPR game. In the
experiment, all subjects play it before being confronted with the CPR game in which
rewards can be given. Let us now turn to describing the CPR game with the option to
reward. The first stage of this game is identical to the unregulated CPR game described
above, but we add a second stage in which subjects can send ‘reward tokens’ to other
group members.2 Each subject receives an endowment of z reward tokens and can
send any integer number of these tokens to any other member of his/her group. Each
reward token kept by a subject is worth one point to that subject. Each reward token
sent to another subject increases the recipient’s payoff by r points, where r = 1 in
Treatment R11 (the transfer reward treatment) and r = 3 in Treatment R13 (the net
positive rewards treatment). Therefore, the payoff of subject i in the second stage of
the CPR game with rewards, πREWi,t , is given by:
πREWi,t = z −
∑
j =i




where pi j,t is the number of reward tokens sent by subject i to subject j in period t ,
and r ∈ {1, 3} is the impact one reward token has on the earnings of the receiver. The
total payoff of subject i in period t , denoted πi,t , in the game with rewards is given by
πi,t = πCPRi,t + πREWi,t .
The standard game-theoretic predictions for the finitely-repeated ‘regulated’ CPR
game (i.e., the one with the option to reward) are straightforward. Applying backward
induction, no rewards will be given in any round. Hence the aggregate number of
extraction tokens used is always equal to the Nash equilibrium level, and the same
level of efficiency of resource use is achieved as in the unregulated CPR game. The
parameter values and the implied Nash equilibrium and social optimum values can be
found in Tables 1 and 2.3
But results may change dramatically if subjects are present who are endowed with
other-regarding preferences (including altruism, reciprocal preferences, and inequality
aversion). Such subjects may be willing to incur costs to reward their peers for acting
cooperatively in CPR stage of the game, and more so in case of net positive rewards
1 The experiment itself was framed neutrally, and we consistently used the phrase ‘the number of tokens
(to be) put into option I’ to denote the subjects’ decision variable.
2 In the experiment, we did not use the term rewards; the ‘stage 2 tokens’ were simply referred to as as
‘tokens.’ This did not cause subjects to confuse these tokens with the ‘tokens that can be put into options
I and II’ of the first stage because all subjects had played the unregulated game before being exposed to
either of the two rewards treatments. To avoid confusion in this article, however, we will refer to the ‘stage
2 tokens’ as ‘reward tokens.’
3 We chose e = 13 because it yields a nice spread between the maximum number (x = 13), the symmetric
socially optimal number (x∗ = 6) and the Nash equilibrium level (xNE = 10). We set z = 12 so that each
individual subject (i) can give an equal number of reward tokens to all other four subjects in his/her group,
if he/she wishes to do so, and (ii) is able to (almost) fully compensate at least one of his/her peers for the
payoff reduction associated with putting in the socially optimal number of extraction tokens even if r = 1.
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Table 1 Experiment parameterization
Variable Description Value
N Number of individuals per group 5
T Number of rounds of the stage game 15
w Wage per extraction token allocated to the outside option 0.5
A Parameter of the resource revenue function 11.5
B Parameter of the resource revenue function 0.15
v Per unit cost of extraction token in resource extraction 2
e Individual endowment of ‘extraction’ tokens 13
z Individual endowment of ‘reward’ tokens 12
rT Impact of receiving reward tokens in Transfer rewards treatment R11 1
rE Impact of receiving reward tokens in Net positive reward treatment R13 3
Table 2 Socially optimal and Nash equilibrium levels of all variables of the stage game
Variable Description Value
x∗ Number of extraction tokens of the symmetric socially optimal outcome 6
X∗ Number of extraction tokens per group of the socially optimal outcome 30
xNE Number of extraction tokens in Nash equilibrium per subject 10
XNE Number of extraction tokens in Nash equilibrium per group 50
pNEi j Nash equilibrium number of reward tokens given 0
π∗ Symmetric socially optimal payoff to CPR use 33.5
πNE Symmetric Nash equilibrium payoff to CPR use 21.5
than if rewards are just transfers.4 This last prediction is based on the ideas that (i)
higher benefits of receiving rewards are more likely to compensate subjects for acting
cooperatively in the social dilemma game (that is, to forego the higher profits associated
with playing best response), and (ii) the higher the benefit/cost ratio of rewards, the
more likely it is that the (non-material) benefits of giving a reward exceed the financial
costs of giving it.
Additionally, the pattern of the use of reward tokens is likely to differ for transfer
and net positive rewards. In case of net positive rewards, subjects have incentives
to exchange reward tokens as this is efficiency increasing. However, they only can
base their reward decision on the behavior of others as observed in the CPR stage.
That means that the number of extraction tokens used may effectively function as a
criterion for selecting partners for mutually beneficial exchange of reward tokens. The
reasoning is as follows. Consider subject j(k) who uses more (not more) extraction
tokens in the CPR stage as compared to subject i . Subject i does have an incentive to
send reward tokens to subject k as subject k behaved at least as cooperatively as subject
i . Also, subject i would not have incentive to send reward tokens to subject j who
did freeride on subject i . By symmetry, subject i would not expect to receive reward
tokens from subject j . That means that apart form the motivation to reward cooperative
behavior in the CPR stage, subjects may send reward tokens to other subjects using the
4 In the CPR game, cooperating (freeriding) means to put fewer (more) tokens into option than one or more
other subjects, thus imposing smaller (larger) negative externalities on all members of the group than the
others do. Therefore, cooperating (freeriding) is defined in relative terms.
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same number of extraction tokens in order to establish mutually profitable exchange
of reward tokens.
2.2 Experiment design
In the Spring semester of 2005, we ran four experimental sessions at Tilburg University,
the Netherlands. In total, 80 subjects participated (40 in each treatment, resulting in
8 independent groups), and they were students in economics, law, or business. The
language of the experiments was English. Upon arrival, participants were randomly
assigned to a computer terminal. They were informed that the experiment consists
of three tasks in total, and all instructions were read out aloud just before the next
task was implemented. The experiments were fully computerized; the software was
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).5
The following three tasks were implemented (in this order): (1) a social orientation
task, (2) the finitely repeated unregulated CPR game, and (3) the finitely repeated CPR
game with a reward stage (either the 1:1 or 1:3 impact ratio, that is Treatment R11
or R13, respectively). The social orientation task, task 1, is implemented to measure
the distributional preferences of each of our subjects. We used the decomposed games
approach as developed by Messick and McClintock (1968), and the data suggest that
if there are any differences in behavior across the two rewards treatments, they are not
due to differences in our subject pools.6
In tasks 2 and 3, subjects were matched into groups of five. They remained in the
same group in all 15 rounds each of these tasks lasted, but their identity numbers
were randomly changed at the beginning of every round. Therefore, the decision to
give a reward to another subject in stage 2 of a specific round can only be based on
that subject’s actions in stage 1 of that same round. If such a scrambling of subjects’
identities was not introduced, subjects might have incentives to engage in reciprocal
exchange of reward tokens across rounds in treatment R13 but not in treatment R11.
Our design rules out this direct reciprocity regarding the use of reward tokens and
only reciprocity with respect to the behavior in the CPR stage is relevant—if at all—in
both treatments. As a result, the pattern of the use of reward tokens is likely to differ
for transfer and net positive rewards. In case of net positive rewards (treatment R13)
subjects have incentives to exchange reward tokens as this is payoff increasing. How-
ever, they can only base their reward decision on the behavior of others as observed
in the CPR stage in the same round. That means that the number of extraction tokens
used may effectively function as a criterion for selecting partners for mutually benefi-
cial exchange of reward tokens. The reasoning is as follows. Consider subject j who
uses fewer extraction tokens in the CPR stage than subject i . Subject i does have an
incentive to send reward tokens to subject j as this subject acted more cooperatively
than subject i . Also, subject i would not expect to receive reward tokens from subject
j in return—especially if the difference in the number of extraction tokens used is
large—as subject i freerode on subject j’s cooperative behavior. That means that apart
from the motivation to reward cooperative behavior in the CPR stage, subjects may
5 Instructions are available from the journal’s webpage. Computer screenshots and software are available
upon request from the authors.
6 For more information about this social orientation task, see for example Offerman et al. (1996).
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send reward tokens to other subjects using more or less the same number of extrac-
tion tokens in order to establish a mutually profitable exchange of reward tokens. In
treatment R11, the latter motivation is absent as exchange of reward tokens is payoff
neutral.
To facilitate decision making in the experiment, we provided subjects with a payoff
table of the CPR game, but we indicated neither the socially optimal nor the Nash
equilibrium number of tokens. To test our subjects’ understanding of how payoffs are
earned, we asked them to answer three test questions before the start of the experiment.
In each round, subjects were informed about the number of extraction tokens used by
each member of their group as well as about his/her payoffs associated with CPR use
in that round. In task 3, subjects were given information about the number of reward
tokens received by each subject, the number of reward tokens not used by this subject,
as well as each subject’s total payoff in the current round. The experiment lasted about
2 hours, and participants earned on average 15.90 Euro (including 5 Euro participation
fee).
3 Data analysis
Let us first analyze extraction behavior in the CPR game, as reflected by the number
of tokens put into option I. Figure 1 presents the aggregate number of extraction
tokens used (averaged over all groups) over all 30 rounds (with rounds 1–15 and
16–30 representing play in the unregulated and regulated CPR games, respectively).
The development of play in the first 15 rounds is very similar for the groups which
were subsequently exposed to either the transfer reward treatment or the net positive
reward treatment (Treatment R11 and R13, respectively), and the null hypothesis of







































Unregulated (period 1 to 15) With rewards (period 16 to 30)
Fig. 1 Average number of extraction tokens used per group in the CPR game
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two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test (N = 16, comprising 8 groups in R11 and 8 groups
in R13, p = 0.959).
Given the similarity of behavior in the first 15 rounds, the difference in play between
the two treatments in rounds 16–30 is striking. The aggregate number of extraction
tokens used is closer to the socially optimal level in Treatment R13 than in Treatment
R11. Indeed, a pairwise test between the aggregate numbers of tokens in a group
in rounds 1–15 and in rounds 16–30 does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis
of equal numbers in Treatment R11 (two-sided Wilcoxon test, N = 8, p = 0.674),
but it does so for Treatment R13 (two-sided Wilcoxon test, N = 8, p = 0.012). In
both treatments, subjects earn 50% of total earnings in the CPR stage. However,
subjects earn on average 86% of the CPR stage Nash Equilibrium payoff in Treatment
R11, while this percentage equals 121% in Treatment R13. Therefore, there are clear
efficiency gains in the CPR stage when rewards are of the net positive type. Consistent
with these findings, the average number of tokens in rounds 16 to 30 in Treatment
R13 is significantly below that in Treatment R11 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test,
N = 16, comprising 8 groups in R11 and 8 groups in R13, p = 0.003). This difference
cannot be attributed to differences in prior expectations as the total number of tokens
in option I in period 16 of Treatment R11 does not differ significantly from that in
R13 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test, N = 16, comprising 8 groups in R11 and 8
groups in R13, p = 0.447). The difference between transfer and net positive rewards
is thus found to develop over time.
In terms of aggregate efficiency, we find that both treatments perform equally well;
subjects obtain respectively 67% and 65% of the maximum payoffs in Treatments R11
and R13 (p-value of 0.178 according to the relevant Mann-Whitney U test). This is
interesting because by definition, there is no welfare loss associated with not using
reward tokens in Treatment R11, but there is in case of Treatment R13. Given that
total efficiency is equal, the gains in CPR efficiency just match the welfare losses of
not using all reward tokens in every round.
Given that the possibility to use reward tokens has a very dissimilar impact on
subjects’ behavior in the CPR game in the transfer (R11) and net positive (R13)
rewards treatments, we now turn to analyzing the use of rewards in each treatment to
uncover the underlying mechanisms. Figure 2 plots the number of reward tokens used
over time for each of the two treatments. Clearly, the number of reward tokens used is
higher in Treatment R13 than in Treatment R11 (Wilcoxon test for paired observations
with a pair being the group average use of reward tokens per period in R11 and in R13,
N = 15, p = 0.001), but not so in the first round (Mann-Whitney U -test on number of
reward tokens used per group in period 16, N = 16, p = 0.432). In both treatments,
though, the number of reward tokens used declines over time, and more prominently
so in Treatment R11 than in Treatment R13.7
Having established that reward tokens are being used, the question arises who
receives them. As subject identifiers are reshuffled at the beginning of every round,
subjects can only base their decision to use reward tokens in the second stage of a
particular period on the observed number of tokens subjects put into option I in the
first stage of that round. In both treatments we observe that the fewer tokens one puts
7 The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients between period and average number of tokens used
equals−0.915 and−0.877 in Treatments R11 and R13, respectively, which are both significant at p = 0.000.
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Nash equilibrium in R11 and R13
Social optimum in R13
Fig. 2 Average number of tokens used as rewards by a subject
into option I as compared to the average of the other four members of one’s group (i.e.,
xi,t − 1N−1
∑
j =i x j,t ) , the more reward tokens one receives. The Spearman correlation
coefficients for Treatments R11 and R13 equal −0.920 and −0.846, respectively,
which are both significant at the 1% level.8
So, at first glance, the difference between the two types of rewards seems to be a
matter of the sheer number of tokens used. But we also find marked differences with
respect to who sends rewards to whom, see Fig. 3. This figure plots the difference
between a donor’s extraction decision and that of the subject who receives the reward
(on the horizontal axis), and the number of reward tokens received (on the vertical axis).
Whereas the resulting line is upward sloping in the transfer treatment, it is hump-shaped
in the treatment with net positive rewards.9 Rewards are most frequently given to
subjects who put in about the same number of tokens into option I in Treatment R13, but
not so in Treatment R11. In the latter case it is the subjects free riding in the CPR game
who reward the subjects acting cooperatively, thus ex-post reducing payoff inequality
within groups. Both these observations are supported by the Spearman correlation
coefficients of the absolute value of the difference in the number of extraction tokens
used by the sender and by the receiver (in the CPR stage of the game) and the number of
reward tokens sent. The Spearman correlation coefficient is negative and significant in
Treatment R13 (−0.227, p = 0.001), while it is positive and significant in Treatment
R11 (0.057, p = 0.001). These conclusions are also supported by regression analysis,
as discussed below.
8 Note one is always better off the fewer the number of extraction tokens used by other subjects in the
group. Therefore, the willingness to reward others is expected to be a decreasing function of the number of
tokens used by the (potential) recipient. This conjecture is supported by the data.
9 This difference in patterns is significant. The relevant Spearman correlation coefficients are 0.876 (p =
0.000) in Treatment R11 and 0.102 (p = 0.629) in Treatment R13.
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Difference in number of extraction tokens used
between the sender and the receiver
Fig. 3 Average number of
reward tokens sent plotted as a
function of the difference
between the number of
extraction tokens used by the
sender and by the receiver in
treatment R11 and R13
The difference in the way in which reward tokens are used in the two treatments
explains the difference in their effectiveness in sustaining cooperation in the CPR
stage of the game. The second stage enables subjects to (i) reciprocate—positively
or negatively—to observed behavior in the CPR stage, and/or (ii) to mitigate payoff
inequalities caused by differences in the use of extraction tokens across subjects.
Independent of the parameterization, these motivations to use reward tokens imply
that subjects using relatively few extraction tokens (the ‘cooperative’ subjects in the
CPR stage) are the reward recipients, and some—but not necessarily all-subjects using
relatively many extraction tokens (subjects freeriding in the CPR stage) are (among)
those sending reward tokens.
But the two treatments differ with respect to the incentives to use reward tokens
for subjects acting cooperatively in the CPR stage. The reward stage does not change
net material payoffs if transfer reward tokens are exchanged between subjects using
an equal number of extraction tokens in the CPR stage. That means that the possi-
bility to reward does not enable cooperative subjects to reinforce cooperation in the
CPR stage. But net positive rewards do allow for such reinforcement. Given the 1:3
ratio, cooperative subjects exchanging rewards may end up with higher payoffs than
subjects who freeride in the CPR stage and do not receive any rewards. This might
stimulate freeriders to adjust their behavior in the CPR stage in order to attract rewards
as well.
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Table 3 Spearman correlation coefficients between the change in individual extraction
effort and the change in the number of reward tokens received (p-values in parenthesis)
Correlation between dxi,t and: Treatment R11 Treatment R13
dPi,t−1> 0 0.132 (p = 0.178) 0.088 (p = 0.230)
dPi,t−1< 0 −0.016 (p = 0.849) 0.150 (p = 0.029)
Let us now have a quick look at how subjects actually respond to changes in reward
tokens received. We conjecture that the opportunity costs of not receiving rewards
across the two treatments affect subjects’ response to a change in the number of
reward tokens received over time. To show this, we calculate the correlation coefficients
between each subject’s change in the number of extraction tokens used between periods
t − 1 and t , and the change in the number of rewards received between period t − 2 and
t − 1. Let us define dxi,t ≡ xi,t − xi,t−1, and dPi,t−1 ≡
∑
j =i p ji,t−1 −
∑
j =i p ji,t−2.
If subjects interpret a decrease in the number of rewards received (dPi,t−1 < 0) as an
expression of disapproval about their behavior in the CPR game, we should observe
dxi,t to be negative, and hence the associated correlation coefficient is expected to
be positive. The prediction for cases where subjects experience an increase in the
number of reward tokens received (dPi,t−1 > 0) is ambiguous, though. The increase
may motivate subjects to further decrease the number of extraction tokens used (dxi,t <
0), but it can also be interpreted as an approval of the current situation; then, we
expect subjects not to change their use of extraction tokens (dxi,t = 0). The correlation
coefficients are presented in Table 3.
The results are revealing. Whereas subjects do not change their use of extraction
tokens when confronted with an increase in the number of rewards tokens received
in both treatments, their response to a decrease in the number of tokens received is
markedly different between the two treatments. It induces subjects to subsequently
decrease their use of extraction tokens in case of the net positive rewards treatment
(p = 0.029), whereas such an effect is absent in the transfer rewards treatment (p =
0.849).
All analyses presented above are based on straightforward (non-parametric) tests,
but we also ran formal regressions to corroborate our results. Using specifications
that include both time and group fixed effects, we analyzed the determinants of (i)
the number of tokens put into option I, (ii) the number of rewards sent by a subject,
and (iii) the total number of rewards received by a subject. The results support our
conclusions presented above, and therefore we just summarize them briefly here.10
Regarding the determinants of the number of extraction tokens used (xi,t ), we find
in both treatments that the number of extraction tokens used is smaller (i) the larger
the number of extraction tokens used by the other four group members in the previous
period (X−i,t−1, i.e. subjects play myopic best response), and (ii) the more reward
tokens the subject received in the previous period (∑ j =i p ji,t−1).
More interesting is the analysis of the decision how many reward tokens subject i
sends to another subject j in his/her group (pi j,t ). Figure 3 suggests that an important
explanatory variable is likely to be the absolute difference between the number of
10 The regression results are available on this journal’s web page.
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tokens put into option I in the CPR stage by the sender and by the receiver |xi,t − x j,t |.
When controlling for own behavior in the CPR stage (xi,t ) as well as for the total number
of reward tokens received in the previous period (∑ j =i p ji,t−1), we find indeed that
the sign of the coefficient on this absolute difference is positive and significant in
Treatment R11, but negative and significant in Treatment R13. Thus, if there is a
mutual gain in exchanging rewards (as is the case in R13), subjects’ behavior in the
CPR game coordinates their rewarding: the smaller the difference in the number of
extraction tokens they used, the more reward tokens are sent among two subjects. This
is not the case if rewards are just pure transfers (as in R11).
Finally, regarding the factors that affect the total number of reward tokens received
(∑ j =i p ji,t ), again we find marked differences between the two treatments. In both
treatments, the number of tokens received depends negatively on the number of tokens
a subject puts into option I (xi,t ), but the comparison with how much the other group
members put into option I (X−i,t ) does not play a role in Treatment R11, whereas it
does in Treatment R13. This is consistent with the observation that in Treatment R11 it
is the free riders in the CPR stage who reward cooperating subjects (which means that
it is just the absolute number of extraction tokens used by a subject that determines how
many reward tokens he/she receives), whereas in Treatment R13 subjects behaving
cooperatively are willing to reward too (and hence a subject’s use of extraction tokens
relative to the group also matters).
4 Conclusions
We revisit the common wisdom in the experimental literature that costly rewards are
unable to sustain cooperation in social dilemma games. Previous studies (Sefton et al.,
2006; Walker and Halloran, 2004) found that transfer rewards are indeed ineffective
in Public Goods games, and we find that this type of rewards is also unable to raise
efficiency in Common Pool Resource games. But this does not mean that rewards are
generally ineffective. This paper finds that if the benefits of receiving a reward exceed
the cost of providing it, the use of extraction tokens in the CPR game is significantly
closer to the social optimum than in case of transfer rewards.
This difference in effectiveness arises because of (i) the difference in profitability
of receiving rewards (and hence also in the opportunity costs of not receiving them),
and (ii) differences in who rewards whom. The first point is self-explanatory, the
second is more surprising. When there are positive net gains from exchanging reward
tokens, establishing such bilateral exchange is in the interest of the players involved.
As subjects who act cooperatively in the CPR stage of the game do not have incentives
to send reward tokens to other subjects free-riding in that CPR stage, bilateral exchange
is established among subjects using the same number of extraction tokens. This gives
material payoff incentives to the freeriders in the CPR stage to decrease the number of
extraction tokens used to attract rewards. Such considerations are absent when there
are zero net gains from exchanging rewards, as in the case of the transfer rewards
treatment.
This explains why efficiency in the CPR game with positive net rewards is unam-
biguously higher than in both the unregulated CPR game and the CPR game with trans-
fer rewards. Whereas transfer rewards are indeed ineffective in sustaining cooperation
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in CPR extraction, net positive rewards do induce subjects to decrease the number of
extraction tokens used towards the socially optimal level.
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